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Fri Mar 28 10:14:46 2008Winners and Losers in Russia's Economic Transition 
The transition ro a market economy has produced a substantial and rapid change 
in the wage structure  in Rus~ia.  Household  surveys taken before and after the 
transition indicate that overall wage inequali~~  nearly doubledfrom 1991 to I994 
and has reached a level higher than that in the  United States, Returns to both 
measured skills  (education, occupation) and  unmeasured skills within groups 
have increased considerab1.y. Skill premiums across experience groups, howevep., 
have become more  compressed and  relative wages of older workers have de- 
clined. In addition, female  wages have declined  relative to male wages across 
all percentiles of the wage distribution. (JEL  J31, P24) 
Russia  is  in  many  ways  unrecognizable 
from the country it was just a few years ago. 
Since  market  reforms  began  in  1992, the 
country has experienced price liberalization, 
near-hyperinflation, and a collapse in aggre- 
gate demand; the reforms have also fostered 
the development of a successful class of en- 
trepreneurs and the mass privatization of 
state-owned enterprises. Russian citizens 
have lived through a period of upheaval 
that-while  beneficial in many ways-few 
would envy. 
Have Russian workers benefited from these 
changes? While recent literature has explored 
the macroeconomics  of the transition as well 
as the country's privatization program, little is 
known about the shifts in the wage structure 
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that have also occurred. Who are the winners 
and losers of the transition? 1s increased wage 
inequality  in  Russia  'keal"  or is  it only  a 
change in compensation from nonwage bene- 
fits to wages? Does it simply reflect high in-
flation  and  imperfect  wage  indexation,  ant1 
thus may be  a transitory  feature of the labor 
market? 
This paper attempts to answer these ques- 
tions using a unique data set of cross-section 
household surveys conducted before and after 
the transition. The most striking result is the 
considerable widening of the overall wage dis- 
tribution.  For both men and  women,  for ex-. 
ample, overall wage inequality nearly doubled 
within two years sf the liberalization of wages 
and prices. By the measure of dispersion used 
in  this paper,  wage inequality  in  Russia  ap- 
pears to have reached a $eve1  higher than that 
in the United States. Returns to education and 
occupation have increased, and  within-group 
inequality  has  grown  substantially.  In  adcli- 
tion, women's  wages have declined relative to 
men's wages, and older workers have suffereti 
sharp relative wage declines. 
Before turning to these results. a brief sur-  " 
vey ofrelated literature discusses ;he .wage dis. 
tribution under  the soviet system as well  as 
changes in the wage  in  &ransi"' 
ti0n  economies. section  outlines  the ecct- 
nomic  reforms  in  Russia  ehro~agh 1994. 
u 

section 111 describes the data seas, and the 
mainder of the paper discusses the ernpincal 
results and exmines some of the underlying 
reasons for the changes. 
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I.  Previous Literature 
The study of Soviet wages dates back to the 
pioneering work of  Abram Bergson (1944), 
with subsequent contributions including those 
of Leonard J. Kirsch (1972),  Frederic L. Pryor 
(1973), Janet G. Chapman (1979), Alastair 
McAuley (1979), and Bergson (1984). Evi- 
dence on the wage distribution in the USSR 
through the 1980's is discussed in Anthony B. 
Atkinson and John Micklewright ( 1992). 
Most studies concluded that Soviet wages 
were relatively unequal for a country ostensi- 
bly  committed  to  equality  of  pay,  and  that 
wage inequality in the Soviet Union was 
within the range experienced by many West 
European countries. All of these studies were 
hampered, however, by a lack of  micro-level 
data.  Although  the  Soviet  statistical agency 
conducted a large household survey for many 
years, its results were only available in aggre- 
gate form.' The only known micro-level study 
(aside from CmigrC surveys) is Katarina Katz 
(1994), which uses a household survey con- 
ducted  in  one city  in  1989 to  study gender 
wage differentials. 
In a related line of  research, a number of 
recent studies have investigated changes in the 
wage structure in Eastern Europe before and 
after the introduction of  market reforms. As 
would be expected  following  the demise of 
centralized wage-setting, virtually all studies 
of these countries report an increase in wage 
inequality before and after transition. Individ- 
ual characteristics such as educational attain- 
ment  and  work  experience  are  revalued  as 
well, but in different ways across countries. In 
Poland, for example, returns to education in- 
creased after the transition to a market econ- 
omy while the experience premium fell (Jan 
Rutkowski,  1996); similar patterns occurred 
in  the Czech  Republic  (Robert J. Flanagan, 
1995; Jii3 VeEernik, 1995).  In contrast, returns 
to both education and experience rose after the 
transition  in  Slovenia (Peter F. Orazem and 
Milan Vodopivec,  1995), although the latter 
is attributed to pension policies unique to Slo- 
venia that reduced the labor supply of expe- 
' This survey is also believed to be unrepresentative; 
see I. I. Dmitrichev (1992) for a description. 
rienced  workers.  Alan  Ei.  Krueger  and 
Jorn-Steffen Pischke (1995) find that returns 
to both education and experience fell slightly 
in eastern Germany after unification. 
Two studies have analyzed recent changes 
in gender wage differentials in Russia using 
the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(Elena Glinskaya and Thomas A. Mroz, 1996; 
Andrew Newel1 and Barry Reilly,  1996). 
Since this survey began in July 1992, however, 
it cannot be used to investigate changes in the 
wage structure before and after the transition 
period. 
11.  Economic Reforms in Russia, 1991-1994 
The basic features of  the Soviet economy 
under  central  planning  are well  known: the 
state owned nearly all productive assets in the 
economy; politicians'  preferences rather than 
consumers'  preferences  guided market out- 
comes; and wages and prices were set admin- 
istratively  by  central  authorities.  While  the 
system  at  first proved  effective  at fostering 
growth, it later became clear that the system 
as implemented in  the Soviet Union created 
significant economic inefficiencies. This real- 
ization  motivated  the  partial  reforms  intro- 
duced  by  Mikhail  Gorbachev  in  the 
mid-1980's, which proved to be insufficient to 
correct the growing macroeconomic imbal- 
ances in the economy. The Soviet Union col- 
lapsed  in  late  1991 and  the  transition  to  a 
market economy began soon thereafter. Wages 
and most prices were freed on January 2,1992, 
and the country's mass privatization program 
was implemented beginning in the fall of that 
year. 
The subsequent Russian reform program 
has been erratic, dominated by the continuing 
power struggle between the legislative and ex- 
ecutive branches, and reflecting the mixed sig- 
nals of the government regarding its intentions 
to  stabilize.  The result  is  perhaps  best  de- 
scribed as a partial stabilizal.ion combined with 
some surprising  successes.  On  the  negative 
side, GDP fell an average of  12 percent per 
year between  1992 and  1994-although  the 
decline is overstated due to the difficulty of 
measuring private-sector  growth-and  infla-
tion has been high, measuring 2,509 percent, 
840 percent, and 215 percent in  1992, 1993, 1096  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1998 
and  1994, respecti~ely.~  re- Unemployment 
mains low compared with other transition 
economies  (7.5 percent in  19941, but this is 
partly due to the extensive use of unpaid ad- 
ministrative  leave and shortened working 
hours  which affected  about 6 percent  of  the 
labor force in 1994. The macroeconomic col- 
lapse has been paralleled by an unprecedented 
demographic crisis, reflected  in sharp in- 
creases in mortality rates and declining birth 
rates.%n  the positive side, shops have been 
filled with consumer goods, there is a growing 
class of successful entrepreneurs, and, perhaps 
most remarkably, by late 1994 nearly 70 per- 
cent of industrial workers were working in pri- 
vate or privatized 
At the same time, wage-setting in Russia has 
been decentralized. Under the previous system 
planners  assigned  wages by  establishing  oc-
cupational wage scales by industry. The wage 
of the lowest-grade occupation was the base 
wage, and the wage of each higher-grade oc- 
cupation was some multiple of  the base. Al- 
though  managers  were  given  increased 
latitude in wage-setting in the mid-1980's, 
wage differentials between and within groups 
remained relatively compressed. 
Wages are now primarily set through infor- 
mal  plant-level  bargaining  with  little union 
influence (Organization for Economic Coop- 
eration and Development, 1995 ). Given this 
shift, the structure of wages is likely to change 
substantially: between- and within-group skill 
differentials will increase in the short run, pos- 
sibly by a great deal, and overall wage disper- 
sion  will  grow.  If  skill is  defined  along 
observable attributes, this implies that returns 
to education and occupation will increase dur- 
ing the transition. In the long run, rising wage 
inequality may be offset by relative supply re- 
sponses, as higher slll  differentials induce un- 
skilled workers to acquire more skills, or by 
government responses to high inequality. For 
the  most  part  these  are  the  changes  docu-
'Figures  in  this  section are from Russian  Economic. 
Trends, 1994, 1996. 
Judith Shapiro ( 1995) analyzes the causes of the mor- 
tality crisis. 
"he  Russian  privatization  program  is  described  in 
Maxim Boycko et al. (1995). 
rnented in the following pages for Russia's ex- 
perience  in  the  years  after  wage  and  price 
liberalization,  although  it is early yet to ob- 
serve  longer-run  responses  to  increased 
inequality. 
111.  Data 
The primary source of data for this study is 
a  series  of  monthly  cross-section household 
surveys conducted by the All-Russian Center 
for Public Opinion Research (or VTsIOM, its 
Russian acronym) in 1991, 1993, and  1994.5 
The sampling frame is the adult population of 
Russia aged 16  and over; each monthly survey 
comprises 3,000-4,000  randomly selected in- 
dividuals  across the country. The areas cov- 
ered by the survey represent roughly one-third 
of Russia's 88 regions. The surveys used here 
were conducted in May 1991 (N  = 2,964); in 
April, May, and June 1993 (N  = 1  1,829) ;and 
in April, May, and June 1994 (N  = 8,868) .' 
The wage data in these surveys have several 
drawbacks. First,  the wages  reported  are 
monthly wages unadjusted for hours worked. 
Since average hours  worked  have  likely 
changed across groups during the transition- 
in  particular  low-paid  workers  are probably 
working fewer hours and highly paid workers 
are working more hours--the  use of monthly 
rather  than  hourly  wages  may  overstate the 
rise in wage inequality. In addition, some in- 
dividuals declined to provide information  on 
wages  (wages are not  topcsded).  Since the 
nonresponse rates are relatively low (4.5 per- 
cent, 4.1  percent,  and  5.9 percent  in  1991, 
1993, and 1994, respectively) the respondents 
with  missing  wage  observations  are  simply 
dropped. The upper tail of the wage distribu- 
'Clearly a pre-1991 data set would he preferred since 
some economic liberalization had already begun by 199  1, 
and because the value of wages in 1991 is difficult to in- 
terpret due to the scarcity of consumer goods in that year. 
This is  the  earliest  year  for  which  data  are  available, 
however. 
"he  sample  selection  procedure  is  described  in 
VTsIOM  ( 1993 pp.  9-10).  The empirical  work  aggre- 
gates the regions into the  11 standard  "macro"  regions 
used for statistical reporting in Russia, plus Moscow city. 
These regions  are: North, Northwest, Central, Volga- 
Vyatsky,  Central  Chernozem,  Povolzhsky,  North  Cau- 
cuses, Urals, West Siberia, East Siberia, and the Far East. VOL. 88 NO. 5  BRAINERD: RUSSIA'S  ECONOMIC TRANSITION  1097 
tion is probably biased downward slightly be- 
cause of these missing wage observations. 
Another potential problem is the high infla- 
tion experienced in Russia during the reform 
period. If  wages were imperfectly indexed at 
the time of these surveys, differing indexation 
mechanisms across industries and occupations 
could lead to large transitory  differentials in 
the monthly  data. A test of  the inflation hy- 
pothesis (discussed below), however, sug- 
gests that the effects of inflation on the wage 
distribution are relatively small. 
Turning to  the education variables  in the 
data sets, education is coded by level of edu- 
cation completed  rather than by  years of 
~chooling.~ Schooling in Russia is compulsory 
through  "incomplete  secondary"  education 
(8th grade, or 7th before 1963) which is 
roughly equivalent to junior high school in the 
United  States. General  secondary  education 
requires ten years of education. Those who ob- 
tain a vocational degree spend one to two years 
in school after secondary education, or three 
years if they entered vocational school with an 
incomplete  secondary  education.  Specialized 
secondary schools require two additional years 
of  schooling  after secondary  education,  and 
provide training in semiprofessional  occupa- 
tions such as nursing  and elementary educa- 
tion.  These institutions  are similar to junior 
colleges  in  the  United  States,  although  the 
training  tends  to  be  highly  specialized.  The 
highest share of the population (about 30 per-
cent) has a specialized secondary degree. Peo- 
ple completing higher education spend an 
additional four to six years in school after sec- 
ondary  school. Higher  education is free and 
most  students receive modest  state stipends, 
although  a  number  of  tuition-based  private 
schools have opened in recent years. 
Since individuals  with  the  same years  of 
schooling may have different educational at- 
tainment (e.g., vocational and specialized sec- 
ondary  education),  most  of  the  analysis  of 
wages by educational attainment uses the level 
rather than years of education. A continuous 
'This description of the Russian education system is 
based  on  Joseph  I. Zajda  (1980),  W.  Ward Kingkade 
( 1990), and  E.  Popovych  and  B. Levin-Stankevich 
(1992). 
years of schooling variable is also constructed 
in  order  to  compute  a  potential  experience 
variable and to have a summary measure for 
the return to an additional year of education8 
While the gender and age structure of the 
respondents in these surveys is similar to that 
of the population, highly educated people are 
overrepresented  in the  surveys  (see Table 
A1 in Appendix A, which compares the 
characteristics of the survey respondents 
with those of the population). While weights 
are provided with the surveys, unweighted 
data are used in the empirical work because 
the weighting methodollogy for 1991 is not 
described in the  available doc~mentation.~ 
Since unweighted data are used and the sur- 
vey respondents are more educated than the 
population as a whole, the results are not na- 
tionally representative. They may be more 
representative of the country's urban, Euro- 
pean  population  which  is  more  highly 
educated. 
IV. Empirical Evidence 
The empirical analysis is restricted to em- 
ployed, working-age civilians, which in Rus- 
sia comprises men aged 18 to 59 and women 
aged I8 to 54. The sample is also restricted to 
workers who earned at least one-half the real 
minimum wage in May  1991; this restriction 
eliminates wage observatioris that appear to be 
coding errors. "' 
Summary statistics for these surveys are 
given in Table 1. As would be expected given 
Years  of  education were assigned as:  primary orless- 
6 years; incomplete secondary-'7  if  aged  15  or  over in 
1963, 8 if  younger than 15 in 1963; general secondary- 
10; vocational plus  incomplete secondary-9  if  aged  15 
or over in 1963, 10 if  younger that1 15 in 1963; vocational 
plus  general secondary-  12; specialized secondary -12; 
incomplete higher-13.5;  higher-15.  Potential  labor- 
market experience was calculated as age - years of  edu- 
cation - 7 (children entered school  at  age 7 until  1984 
when the age was lowered to 6). 
The sensitivity of  the results to these and other restric- 
tions is discussed  in Chapter 1 of Brainerd  (1996),  an 
earlier version of  this paper.  IJsing weights generally in- 
creases the inequality measures reported here. 
"The empirical work uses wages from the primary job 
only and  includes agricultural workers and  self-employed 
individuals. Military workers are excluded due to missing 
wages. 1098  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER  1998 
Panel A 
Percent in sector 
Industry, construction, transport, communications 
Agriculture, forestry 
Trade, public catering, housing services 
Education, health, culture, arts 
Public administration, financial, insurance 
Army, military, security 
Other 
Percent in state sector 
Men 
Women 
Percent with two jobsa 
Men 
Women 
Average weekly hoursb 
Men 
Women 
State sector 
Private sector 
Sample size 
Panel B 
Mean nominal wage, rubleslmonth 
Men 
Women 
Femalelmale 
Median nominal wage, rubleslmonth 
Men 
Women 
Femalelmale 
State- and private-sector mean wages 
State 
Private 
Statelprivate 
Men: 
State 

Private 

Statelprivate 

Women: 

State 

Private 

Statelprivate 

State-sector mean wages, femalelmale 
Private-sector mean wages, femalelmale 
Sample size 
Notes: Data are for the employed population aged 18-59  (men) and 18-54  (women). 
" 1991 data are from an October 1991 VTsIOM survey (N = 2,229); the May  1991 survey has no information on 
second jobs. 
" 1991 data are from the May VTsIOM survey; 1993 and 1994 data are summary statistics from an enterprise survey 
conducted by Goskomstat (1994b, 1995b). Average hours worked in each sector are weighted by employment. 1099  VOL.  88 NO.  5  BRAINERD: RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
the skewed industrial structure that Russia in- 
herited from its predecessor, employment in 
industry declined over the sample period while 
employment  in  services  increased.  EmpXoy- 
ment in the state sector fell from 87 percent to 
57 percent, reflecting the acceleration OF Rus-
sia's mass privatization program. Women are 
disproportionately  employed  in  the  state 
sector. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 summarizes the 
development of nominal wages in the sample. 
In 1991 women fared relatively well; median 
female earnings were 83 percent of  those of 
men (unadjusted for hours)  .I'  This compares 
favorably with other developed countries; in 
the  United  States,  for  example,  the  median 
gender wage ratio for weekly earnings was 74 
percent  in  1991 (Francine D.  Blau  and 
Lawrence M. Kahn,  1997). By  1994, how- 
ever, the median gender wage ratio had fallen 
to only 60 percent. The gender wage differ- 
ential in 1991 was partly due to shorter aver- 
age work hours for women  (40.2 hours per 
week for women versus 43.5 for men), but in 
1993 shorter hours appear to explain little of 
the gap. As in many countries the gender wage 
differential is significantly smaller in the state 
sector than in the private sector. 
The average wage in  the private  sector is 
higher than in the state sector, particularly in 
1993. In  1991 state-sector workers earned 92 
percent  of  private-sector  wages;  this  fell  to 
only 59 percent in  1993 before recovering to 
82 percent in  1994. Some of this gap is due to 
higher average hours of private-sector work- 
ers: the  1991 sample indicates  that  private- 
sector hours were  11 percent higher than 
state-sector hours. Other explanations for the 
pay gap include differences in industrial struc- 
" Relatively high  female wages  in  1991 could be 
anomalous because the officially reported mean and me- 
dian femalelmale monthly wage ratios in Russia were only 
69.1  percent  and 70.9 percent, respectively,  in  1989 
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992).  If high female wages 
are anomalous, the  decline in  female relative wages  is 
overstated. However,  in  another VTsIOM  survey con- 
ducted in October 1991 (N  = 2,229) the mean and median 
gender wage ratios are nearly identical to those reported 
here. Relative improvements in  female wages may  have 
been  due  to  Gorbachev's  wage  reforms which,  among 
other things, increased wages in female-dominated indus- 
tries and occupations (see Chapman, 1991  ). 
ture (state enterprises may be concentrated in 
lower-paying industries) and differing provi- 
sion  of  nonwage  benefits  between  the  two 
sectors.'' 
Changes in Overall Wage Inequality. -This 
section examines the change in skill differen- 
tials defined along various dimensions of skill. 
Shll  is first defined generally, so that the wage 
itself and the worker's position  in  the wage 
distribution is taken to be a measure of  skill. 
The 90th percentile of  the wage distribution, 
for example, represents highly skilled workers 
while the 10th percentile represents the least- 
skilled workers.  Skill is then defined by  the 
observable characteristics  of  education level 
and occupational status; experience differen- 
tials and the gender gap are examined as well. 
Finally,  skill  differentials  within  these  nar-
rowly defined groups are analyzed. This dis- 
cussion will show that skill differentials have 
increased along nearly all dimensions of  skill 
in Russia. 
Looking first at changes in the overall wage 
distribution, wage dispersion has grown mark- 
edly since 1991. The first piece of evidence is 
shown in Table 2, Panel A. From May  1991 
to May  1994, the 90-10  bog  wage differen- 
tial  for men nearly doubled, increasing from 
1.06 log points to 1.95 log points. The 90- 10 
differential increased by  nearly  as much for 
women. For men the top half of the wage dis- 
tribution widened considerably  (0.24 log 
points), but by much less than the increase in 
the bottom half (0.64 log points). For women 
the changes in the distribution were more 
equal, but the bottom half also widened more 
than the top half.14 
The large increase in disptxsion in the bottom 
half of  these wage distributions may reflect, in 
"The  term  "private  sector"  reflects a continuum of 
ownership forms ranging from state enterprises that have 
been  converted into joint  stock companies to  privately 
owned firms. Although of  interest, it is beyond the scope 
of  this paper to investigate the state-sectorlprivate-sector 
wage differential in detail. 
I?The difference in log wages at the 90"' and loth  per- 
centiles of the wage distribution. 
l4The government's  measure: of  income inequality 
shows a similar increase: the Gini coefficient increased 
from 0.26 in 1991 to 0.40 in late 1994 (Russian Economic 
Trend.7, 1994). 1100  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1998 
TABLE 2-SUMMARY  MEASIJKES  LOG WAGE OF  .!'HE  DISTKIUU.I.I~N 
Panel A 
Men 
90-10 

90-50 

50-10 

Variance 
Women 
90-10 

90-50 

50- 10 

Variance 
All 
90-10 

90-50 

50-10 

Variance 
Panel  B 
Men (log hourly wages) 
90- 10 
U.S. 
U.K. 

90-50 

U.S. 
U.K. 

50-10 

U.S. 
U.K. 
-- 
1991  1993  1993"  1994  Change 
(Mav)  (Mav)  (IMuv)  (Mav)  1991-1994 
1.063  1.946 
0.606  1.030 
0.457  0.916 
0.184  0.649 
1.012  1.818 
0.565  0.949 
0.446  0.869 
0.168  0.535 
1.079  1.928 
0.511  1.012 
0.568  0.916 
0.189  0.623 
1979  1990  Change 
Women (log hourly wages) 
90-10 
U.S. 
U.K. 

90-50 

U.S. 
U.K. 

50-10 

U.S. 
U.K. 
Notes: The 90- 10 log wage differential is the difference  in log monthly wages at  the 90thand  loth percentiles of  the wage 
distribution. Source of  U.S. and  U.K. data: Lawrence Pi. Katz et al. (1995 p. 58). 
"Wages  in this column have been inflated by regional consumer price  indices for both March and April  1993,applied 
to wages of  individuals reporting that they had  not received wage increases in the two months prior  to the survey. 
part, the erosion of the real minimum wage over 
the course of  the reform period.'%s  indicated 
I5The minimum  wage  is  a monthly  min~mun~  and 
covers all  full-time workers. 
in Figure 1, the nnrrpimurn wage has fallen from 
about 30 percent of the average wage in the late 
1980's to under 9 Dercent of the average wage 
in  1994. Wlile this decline undoubtedvly hGs 
less-skilled workers, it probably  also increases VOL. 88 NO. 5  BRAINERD: RUSSIA'S  ECONOMIC  TRANSITION 
Percent 
FIGURE 1. MINIMUM  AS A PERCENTAGE  WAGE,  1985-1994  WAGE  OF THE AVERAGE 
Sources: Narodnoye Khozyiastvo RSFSR v 1989 Gody [National Economy of the RSFSR 
in 19891 (Goskomstat,  1990 p.  135); Russian Economic  Trends (1994 p. 47);Tseny v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Prices  in the Russian Federation] (Goskomstat, 1994e pp. 90-91 ). 
the relative employment of the less skilled, and 
may in part explain Russia's low unemployment 
rate. The widening of  the distribution in both 
tails also reflects the lack of  formal wage-bar- 
gaining structures in Russia. 
While the decentralization of wage-setting 
should eliminate the labor-market distortions 
characteristic of  the old system, a new insti- 
tution-the  excess wages tax-distorted  the 
wage structure in new ways. Until 1996, when 
the excess wages tax was repealed, enterprises 
paid a tax on the excess of the average wage 
of the enterprise over some minimum, which 
was four times the minimum wage before Jan- 
uary  1994 and six times the minimum wage 
after that.16 Since the minimum wage had 
eroded to extremely low levels, the tax created 
an incentive for employers to compensate 
highly skilled workers with nonmonetary ben- 
efits or unreported cash payments, and to re- 
tain  unproductive  workers  at  low  wages  in 
order to depress the average wage in the en- 
'"he  tax has varied from 32 percent in 1993 to 12- 
25 percent in 1994 (Organization for Economic Cooper- 
ation and Development, 1995). 
terprise. Innovative schemes to evade the tax 
(for example, by paying employees  "life  in- 
surance payments"  rather than wages) were 
widely reported. This suggests that wages in 
the upper tail of  the distribution were under- 
reported and that the widening of this tail was 
understated,  especially  for  men. The excess 
wages tax also depressed wages in the lower 
tail of the distribution, by rewarding firms for 
retaining low-paid workers on their payroll. 
To put these figures in perspective, Panel B 
of Table 2 compares the changes in the Rus- 
sian wage distribution with those of the United 
States and Britain in the  1980's. As is well 
known, during this period wage inequality in- 
creased markedly in both countries,  and nu- 
merous  scholars  have  documented  and 
analyzed  these  changes.I7 While substantial, 
the changes in these countries are small rela- 
tive to those that have occurred in Russia.I8 
"See, for  example, Katz  and  Kevin  Ivl.  Murphy 
(1992), Murphy and Finis Welch (1992), and Chinhui 
Juhn et al. (1993). 
l8 Note, however, that the figures in Panel B are not 
directly comparable with those of Panel A since the former 
measure hourly rather than monthly wages. THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1998 
1  1 ,---- -7
All  -- --
0  LO  20  30  40  50  80  70  80  90  100 

Percentile  of real  wage distribution 

Men  and  women and women 
1 
 Men 
Women 
Note: Wages for 1994 were deflated into 1991 rubles using the wage deflation procedure 
described in Appendix B. 
The widening  of  the  wage  distribution is  illustrated in Figure 2 (top panel), which 
pervasive  across  all percentiles of  the  wage  shows the log change in real wages from 1991 
distribution for both men and women. This is  to 1994 by percentile of the wage distribution. 1103  VOL. 88 NO. 5  BRAINERD: RUSSIA'S  ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
While the median real wage appears un- 
changed, '"increased  wage inequality is nearly 
a linear function of the percentile of the wage 
distribution. Less-skilled  workers have lost 
substantially in real terms while highly skilled 
workers  have  reaped  considerable  gains.  A 
similar pattern is evident for men and women 
separately  (bottom panel), but  women have 
lost  relative  to men  consistently  at all  skill 
levels. 
Is  this  tremendous  increase in wage  in- 
equality real or does it simply reflect  high 
inflation rates (averaging 19 percent per 
month in the  1993 sample and 7 percent in 
the 1994 sample) and imperfect wage index- 
ation? If wages are adjusted more frequently 
for skilled workers than for unskilled work- 
ers, the monthly wages used here may over- 
state wage inequality. 
Simply studying the changes in Table 2 can 
shed some light on this issue. Since the infla- 
tion rate decreased significantly from 1993 to 
1994, if increased inequality in 1993 were due 
mainly to high inflation these measures should 
decline in 1994. But the 90- 10 log wage dif- 
ferentials are essentially unchanged between 
these two years. Moreover, explicitly adjusting 
for differing wage indexation across workers 
affects  the  90-10  differential  only  slightly. 
The 1993 surveys asked respondents whether 
they had received a wage increase in the past 
two months; an average of 72.3 percent had 
received increases but fewer in the bottom end 
of  the wage distribution had received an in- 
crease  (63 percent  in the  1  --10 percentiles) 
compared with those in the top end (86percent 
in the 91  -99  percentiles). This information is 
used to calculate a lower bound for the 1993 
log wage differentials: the wages of  all indi- 
viduals  who  received  no indexation  are  in- 
flated by the relevant regional consumer price 
indices for the two months prior to the surveys. 
The results of  this exercise are shown in the 
IY The real wage changes shown here conflict with of- 
ficial data that show a nearly 40 percent decline in real 
wages between  1991 and 1994. The discrepancy may be 
due to the inconsistent deflator used here  (described in 
Appendix B)  or due to enterprise underreporting of wages 
to avoid taxes. Real wages have probably declined more 
than is indicated, but the bias is unlikely to affect the rel- 
ative changes across percentiles of the wage distribution. 
italicized column of Table 2. While male and 
overall wage inequality do decline somewhat 
relative to the unadjusted wages (particularly 
in the upper part of the distribution), the order 
of magnitude of the inequality is similar in the 
two measures. Thus, even after adjusting for 
differing wage indexation: across workers, 
wage inequality still increased sharply in 
1993. Moreover, inflationary distortions were 
probably  smaller  in  1994 than  in  1'393, be- 
cause inflation was lower and more efficient 
wage  indexation  mechanisms were  likely  in 
dace in 1994. 
It is also possible that the new inequality 
in  Russia  simply  reflects  a  change  in  the 
form of com~ensation  rather than a real in- 
crease in  inequality. It is  well known that 
Soviet enterprises provided  generous non- 
wage benefits  to employees in the form of 
housing, day care, medical facilities, and ac- 
cess to subsidized food and goods. If these 
benefits  were  distributed  unequally  across 
workers,  the  Soviet wage distribution may 
have been highly unequal, with the inequal- 
ity created through differing access to ben- 
efits rather than through direct monetary 
compensation. In response to the reforms, 
firms may have simply converted the bene- 
fits into cash wages,  thus substantially  in- 
creasing reported wage inequality. 
Evidence on this issue is limited but sug- 
gests that the increase in  inequality is real 
tather than a change in the form of compen- 
sation. In particular, firms have been slow to 
shed benefits provided to workers during the 
transition.  A  1993 survey of  340 state and 
private industrial  firms in three regions re- 
ported that most enterprises continue to pro- 
bide both managers and workers with a wide 
range of benefits (Guy Standing, 1994). 
One-third of the enterprises had actually 
added benefits in 1992 and 1993, while less 
than 25 percent had discontinued any bene- 
fits."  If  enterprises are continuing to offer 
the same or even more benefits  to workers, 
This may be a reaction to the excess wages tax de- 
scribed above; it could also reflect that managers of  pri- 
vatized enterprises have an incentive to maintain or add 
benefits in order to gain worker support. THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEiMBER  1998 
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Note: May and  June  1994 wages have been deflated into April  1994 wages using the relevant regional consumer price 
indices for those months. 
replacing benefits with cash wages has not 
led to rising wage inequality. 
To summarize, the increase in wage disper- 
sion is not a transitoiy illusion created by high 
inflation or by a shift in the form of compen- 
sation from nonwage benefits to cash wages. 
The magnitude of the increase in inequality is 
striking, and  the  new  level  of  inequality  in 
Russia is higher than that in the United States. 
Since the skill composition of the labor force 
is unlikely  to have changed  silbstantively in 
three  years,  the increase  in wage  dispersion 
almost surely reflects an increase in market re- 
turns to measured and unmeasured skills. 
Chaages in Returns  to Measured Skills.-- 
First loolting at returns to education, Figure 3 
(top panels) shows an index of wages by ed- 
ucation level for men and women in 1991 and 
1994. For men, wage differentials by  educa- 
tion  are  modest  and  have  increased slightly 
since I99  1. For example, the wage premium 
for higher education over secondary is only 46 
percent, compared with about 70 percent for 
men in the United  States in the late  1980's. 
The story is much the same for women, except 
that an already higher wage premium for a uni- 
versity  education  (38 percent  in  1991) in- 
creased to 65 percent in 1994. ~ ~ ~ ~ 
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Occupational premiums show a similar pat- 
tern  of  increasing  relative  wages  for  more-
skilled workers."  For example, the ratio of the 
wage of top managers to the average wage in- 
creased from 1.28 in 1991 to 1.81 in 1994. In 
contrast the ratio of unskilled blue-collar urban 
wages to the average wage fell from 0.75 in 
1991 to 0.56 in 1994. 
Increases in returns to education are also ev- 
ident when one controls for other demographic 
and work attributes. This is shown in Tables 
3A and  3B, which  summarize the results of 
OLS regressions of  log monthly wages on a 
vector of  demographic and work characteris- 
tics for 1991, 1993, and 1994.22  The first two 
columns for each year show pure human cap- 
ital earnings functions, in which log wages are 
regressed  on  categorical  education  variables 
(or a continuous years of schooling variable), 
potential  experience  and  its  square,  and  11 
dummy variables for region. Returns to edu- 
cation in this specification include the effect 
of education in allocating workers into low- or 
high-paying occupations or industries. The re- 
gression in the third column adds dummy vari- 
ables  for  marital  status  and  state-sector 
employment, six industry dummies, and nine 
occupation dummie~.~.'  For 1993 and 1994 the 
three months of  data are pooled, and month 
dummies and month times region interaction 
terms are included to control for the effects of 
inflation over the three months. 
Like the simple wage ratios of Figure 3, re- 
turns to education increased for both men and 
women over the course of  the transition. For 
men the return to an additional year of  edu- 
cation increased from 3.1 percent in  1991 to 
6.7 percent in  1994 (Table 3A). Using cate- 
gorical education variables, the return to hav- 
" Because  the  occupation  codes  labels  are  missing. 
from the  1991 data set:  an October  1991 data set (N 5 
2,229) is used to calculate these wage ratios. 
22 The standard errors from these equations were also 
estimated using White's  formula to allow for heteroske- 
dasticity. Since these are nearly identical to the OLS es- 
timates, the latter are presented here. 
"Eighteen  occupation dummies were used for the 
1991 data set due to the missing occupation code labels 
for the 1991 data set. Brainerd ( 1996) reports the coeffi- 
cients  on  the  occupation,  industry,  and  region  dummy 
variables for these regressions. 
ing a university degree over a specialized 
secondary degree increased monotonically 
over the period, from 8.3 percent in  1991 to 
16.1 percent  and  21.6 percent  in  1993 and 
1994, respectively. The same regressions for 
women (Table 3B) also show an increase in 
returns to education, from 5.4 percent in 1991 
to  9.6  percent  in  1994. University-educated 
women earn 30 percent more: than women with 
specialized  secondary education, compared 
with 21 percent more in  1991 (using the hu- 
man capital specification). 
In contrast to widening education and oc- 
cupation  differentials,  wage  differentials 
across experience groups became more com- 
pressed during the transition. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3 (bottom panels), which also shows 
the flat experience-earnings profile character- 
istic of the Soviet Union in earlier periods. A 
striking feature of men's experience premiums 
is that in 1994 men who would be at the peak 
earning age in most other countries (i.e., the 
45-55  age-group) earned little more on av- 
erage than  did  new  entrants  to the labor 
market. For women, less-experienced workers 
also gained on more-experienced workers 
across all experience groups, but the compres- 
sion is less dramatic than it is for men. 
Similarly, the return to t'he first year of  ex- 
perience in a log wage ec~uiuation-already  low 
by western standards in 1991  -fell  sharply for 
men from 2.5 percent in 1991 to just 0.8 per-
cent in 1993, before increasing to 1.5 percent 
in 1994 (using the full specification). Returns 
to experience fell for women as well, from 3.5 
percent in 1991 to 2.1 percent and 1.7 percent 
in 1993 and 1994, respectively. 
Why have younger workers gained relative 
to older workers? The compression of  expe- 
rience differentials likely reflects a relative de- 
mand shift against older cohorts. The human 
capital embodied in the most experienced 
workers reflects skills acuuired ~inder  the 
"Old"  System which  different skills 
than  does  the  "new"  system. For example, 
successful  Soviet  were 
skilled in supply procurement, negotiating 
government subsidies, and maximizing output. 
~  ~  ~  ~ is un-  i in developing these  r 
likely to be rewarded in the new  Russia, 
in which  the most sought-after ?managers 
are  trained  in  management,  finance,  and 1106  THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1998 
TABLE 3A-LOG  MEN WAGE  EQLIA'~IONS: 
May 1991  April-June  1993  April-June -
Dependent variable:  Human  Human  Human  Human  Human  Human 
Log of monthly wages  capital  capital  Full  capital  capital  Full  capital  capital 
Education levels:" 
Primary 
Incomplete secondary  -0.173  -0.122  -0.321  -0.075  -0.270 
(-2.99)  (-2.09)  (-4.85)  (- 1.18)  (-3.72) 
Secondary 
Vocational 
Some university 
University 
Years of education 
Experience 
Experience2/100 
Married 
State sector 
Constant 
Occupation dummies  no 
Industry dummies  no 
Region dummies  Yes 
Month dummies  yes 
Region*month 
dummies  yes 
0.145 
SE of regression  0.739 
Sample size  2,984 
Notes:  t-statistics  are reported in parentheses. 
" Omitted variable is specialized secondary education. 
1994 
Full 
-0.038 
(-0.56) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
yes 
yes 
0.316 
0.641 
2,198 -- 
----  -- 
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May 1991  April-June  1993  April-June  1994 
Dependent variable:  Human  Human  Human  Human  Human  Human 
Log of monthly wages  capital  capital  Full  capital  capital  Full  capital  capital  --Full 
Education levels:' 
Primary 
Incomplete secondary  -0.076  -0.0004  --0.311  -0.116  -0.387  -0.220 
(-1.33)  (-0.01)  (--5.01)  (-1.82)  (-5.75)  (-3.28) 
Secondary 
Vocational 
Some university 
University 
Years of education  0.054 
(8.74) 
Experience  0.031 
(6.92) 
0.035 
(7.56) 
0.035 
(7.31) 
0.022 
(5.04) 
0.025 
(5.52) 
0.021 
(4.80) 
0.013 
(2.74) 
0.016 
(3.46) 
0.017 
(3.67) 
Married 
State sector 
Constant  4.55  5.18  5.26  8.19  9.09  9.03  2.96  4.10  4.24 
(53.4)  (105.5)  (67.3)  (88.8)  (150.5)  (126.9)  (28.6)  (53.5)  (54.0) 
Occupation dummies 
Industry dummies 
Region dummies 
Month dummies 
Region*month 
dummies 
SE of regression 
Sample size 
Notes:  t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
" Omitted variable is specialized secondary education. 1108  THE AMERICAN  ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER I998 
marketing. The new human capital embodied 
in young cohorts is now apparently more valu- 
able than the old human capital embodied in 
older cohorts. 
This cohort effect is also compounded by 
the realities of discounting. Since the incentive 
to invest in human capital depends not only on 
the returns to human capital but  also on the 
length of  the individual's  time horizon  over 
whych  investments can be recouped  through 
higher earnings (Gary S, Becker, 1964; Jacob 
Mincer. 1974)-  older workers with short time 
horizon's may'not  find it worthwhile to invest 
in learning the new skrlls necessary to be suc- 
cessful in the new economy. The same argu- 
ment applies to employers who find it more 
profitable to invest in retraining younger work- 
ers. Thus shorter time horizons and irrelevant 
skills may explain some of the relative wage 
declines of  older workers. 
It is puzzling that returns to experience are 
higher for women than for men. in contrast to  u 

the  standard  outcome  in  most  countries  of 
higher returns to experience for men. Differing 
time horizons may explain this as ~ell.~%ur- 
ing the transition male life expectancy at birth 
has fallen tremendously,  from 63.8 years in 
1990 to only 57.7 years in  1994 (recall that 
the retirement age for men is age 40).  In other 
words male workers with 30-plus years of ex- 
perience  have  relatively  short time horizons 
and thus little incentive to acquire new  skill^.^" 
While female life expectancy has also fallen 
(from 74.3 years in  1990 to 71.3 in  1994), a 
50- or 55-year-old  woman  still has stronger 
incentives to acquire new ski6ills than does her 
male counterpart, and employers have stronger 
incentives to provide training in these skills. 
Female-Male  Wage Differentials. --While 
older men have fared poorly relative to other 
l4Higher female experience premiums are not an arti- 
fact of  using a younger  female  sample; the  same result 
holds when the 18-65  age-group for both sexes is studied 
(see Brainerd, 1996). Newel1 and Reilly ( 1996) also find 
higher returns to age for women in Russia using a 1992 
data set. 
"Conditional on reaching the 45 to 49 age-group, for 
example, remaining life expectancy for men in 1994 was 
only 20.7 years  compared  with  30.1  years  for women 
(Goskomstat, 1995a). 
groups, all women have fared poorly relative 
to men. The mean femalelmale wage ratio fell 
dramatically from 1991 to 1994 (see Table 1  ), 
and this is observed even when  one controls 
for differences in education and work charac- 
teristics. The coefficient on a dummy variable 
for  gender (female  = 1) declines in  human 
capital earnings regressions in which men and 
women are pooled,2h  from -0.248  in 1991 to 
-0.464  and -0.446  in 1993 and 1994, respec- 
tively. Including occupation, industry, and 
state-sector dummy variables and state times 
female interactions has little effect on this re- 
sult: the coefficient on the female dummy vari- 
able (including interaction effects) is -0.203 
in  1991 and still falls to -0.348  and -0.389 
in 1993 and  1994. Thus little of  the female- 
male wage gap appears to be due to occupa- 
tional and industrial shifts that have adversely 
affected women. 
Why have women's  wages  declined so 
sharply relative to men's wages?27  Since fe- 
male work hours appear similar to male hours 
(Table I ), relative changes in work hours are 
unlikely to explain the change. One might sus- 
pect that gender-specific factors have played a 
role; for example the breakdown of state con- 
trol  over  enterprises may  have  enabled ern- 
ployers to discriminate against women more 
openly. 
The most important factor in  the growing 
gender gap, however, is the shift in the overall 
wage structure in the economy. Since women 
are  disproportionately  among  the  low-wage 
2%e  human capital specification regresses log wages 
on  categorical  education  variables, potential  experience 
and  its  square,  region  dummies,  and  month  and 
montheregion dummies in the 1993 and 1994 regressions. 
Female dummy variables are significant at less than the I-
percent level in these regressions. The "full"  specification 
includes these variables as well as dummy variables for 
state-sector employment and marital status, female*state- 
sector and female"marita1 status interaction terms, 18 or 
9 occupation dummies, and 6 industry dummies. The co- 
efficient  on the female dummy variable is significant  at 
less than the  I-percent level in all three years in this re- 
gression.  Female*state  interactions  are  insignificant  in 
1991 but are significant  at the  1-percent and 5.5-percent 
levels in 1993 and 1994, respectively. 
"As noted in footnote 11, relatively high female wages 
in  1991 may have been anomalous, so the decline in fe- 
male wages relative to male wages may be overstated. 1109  VOL. 88 NO. 5  RRAINERD: RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
workers, the increase in wage dispersion has 
penalized  female  wages  relative  to male 
wages. The best evidence of this is provided 
by  the position of  the median female in the 
male wage distrib~tion.~~  A decline in the me- 
dian female percentile over time indicates that 
observable  skills have  declined,  or that  dis- 
crimination has increased (i.e., the median fe- 
male is considered to have skills comparable 
to  a male in  a lower percentile  of  the male 
wage distribution). The position of the median 
female in the male wage distribution remained 
nearly unchanged, however, at the 30.2 per- 
centile in 1991 and the 30.4 and 33.0 percen- 
tiles  in  1993  and  1994,  respectively. 
Remarkably, this suggests that the increase in 
the gender gap is due almost entirely to the 
increase in  overall  wage inequality; gender- 
specific factors appear to explain little of the 
poor labor-market outcomes of women in Rus- 
sia's tran~ition.~" 
Within-Group Inequality. -While  most 
dimensions of between-group inequality 
have increased, the changes are too modest 
to have alone accounted for the substantial 
increase  in  overall  wage  inequality  docu-
mented here. Increases in inequality within 
narrowly defined demographic groups have 
contributed at least as much, and likely 
more, than between-group  inequality to the 
rise in overall inequality. 
One indicator of  within-group inequality is 
the dispersion of  residuals from a log wage 
equation, which reflects inequality within nar- 
'' Blau  and  Kahn  (1995,  1997) use  this  statistic to 
study international  differences in the gender gap and 
changes in the gender gap in the United States. It is cal- 
culated by assigning each woman a percentile ranking in 
the male wage distribution, and finding  he ranking of the 
median female. 
*'  Female labor-force participation rates have also de- 
clined over this period. Long one of  the highest rates in 
the world, the female participation rate fell from 84.2 per- 
cent in 1989 to 78.6 percent in 1994. This decline, how- 
ever, was matched by  a decline in the male labor-force 
participation rate from 87.5 percent to 80.8 percent. [Par-
ticipation rates are from the  1989 Census (Goskomstat, 
1991) and the  1994 Labor Force  Survey  (Goskomstat, 
1994d)  .I Note that the 1989 rates may be overstated due 
to  state pressure  on citizens to report  themselves as 
employed. 
rowly defined groups. Using the human capital 
specification of Table 3 (with categorical ed- 
ucation variables), the 90- 10 differential for 
the residual distribution for men increased 
from 0.98 to 1.78 from 1991 to 1994 and from 
0.86 to 1.56 for women aver the same period. 
In other words, the most skilled within nar- 
rowly defined groups have gained roughly 75 
percent relative to the least skilled. Residual 
inequality falls slightly when industry, occu- 
pation, and state-sector variables are included 
in the regression, but for both men and women 
those at the 90th percentile within groups gain 
nearly 65 percent relative to those at the 10th 
percentile.-~n  both specifications and for both 
men and women the increases in the lower half 
of the residual distribution are larger than 
those in the upper half. 
The contribution  of  growing within-group 
inequality to rising overall wage inequality can 
be examined using a technique developed by 
Juhn et al. ( 1993) which decomposes the 
change  in  the  entire  wage  distribution  into 
changes due to changes in observable prices 
and quantities,  and to  unobservable  compo- 
nents. This decomposition was carried out us- 
ing  both  the  human  capital  and  "full" 
specifications and using 1991 and  1994 as the 
base year. Selected results are shown in Table 4. 
This exercise indicates that changes in both 
observable skill ~rices  and  in unobservables 
have contributed to the rise in inequality, with 
the latter playing the leading role. Changes in 
the residuals explain more of the widening of 
the bottom half of the wage: distribution, while 
changes in observable slull prices also explain 
the changes in the top half of the distribution. 
Quantities play a negligible role, as would be 
expected  given  the  short  time  period  under 
study."  Thus both the increases in observable 
skill premiums across education and occupa- 
tion  groups  documented  above,  and  the  in- 
creased market returns to unobservable skills 
within groups, have contributed to the rise in 
wage inequality in Russia. 
"The  offsetting effect of quantities on the 90-50  male 
differential may be anomalous; changes in quantities have 
a negligible effect on the 90-.50  differential if 1994 is used 
as the base year. Results are otherwise similar using 1994 
as the base  year  as well as using  the human capital 
specification. -- 
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Total change in  Change due to changes in: 
differential: 
Quantities  Prices  Residuals -
Men: 	 90-10  0.883  -0.1 84  0.484  0.583 
90-50  0.241  -0.196  0.215  0.222 
50 -10  0.642  0.013  0.268  0.361 
Women: 	 90- 10  0.799  -0.008  0.328  0.478 
90--50  0.329  -0.050  0.181  0.198 
50.- 10  0.470  0.043  0.147  0.241 
Notes: The decomposition is based  on the "full"  regression specification of  'Tables 3A 
and  3B except that the regressions exclude occupation dummies. The decomposition is 
calculated by first computing  the relevant summary  measures of the wage distxibutions 
(e.g.,  the change in the 90- 10 differential). If 1991is the base year, as it is here, a synthetic 
wage distribution for  1991 is then created  using the  1994 distribution of quantities but 
holding skill prices and  the residual distribution constant at their 1991levels. The changes 
in the summary statistics between this synthetic wage distribution and  the original wage 
distribution are attributed to changes in quantities. A second synthetic wage distribution is 
then created which uses the  1994 skill prices  and  quantities, again holding the residual 
distribution constant. Changes in the summary statistics from the first synthetic distribution 
are attributed to changes in observable skill prices.  Finally, any unexplained changes in 
the summary  statistics that remain are attributed  to changes in the residual distribution, 
i.e., to changes in unobservable prices  and  quantities. The decomposition using  1994 as 
the base year  would be computed in a similar manner. See Juhn et al. (1993)for a complete 
description of  this technique. 
The evidence given  in the preceding  sec-
tions raises  a number of  questions regarding 
the change in the wage structure in Russia. For 
example, what is driving these increasing mar- 
ket returns to unobserved skills-is  it simply 
the inability to control for other characteristics 
that affect labor-market outcomes? Moreover, 
why has the change in the wage structure been 
so extreme, apparently more so than in the re- 
forming East European countries? 
Given limited data, one can only speculate 
on the answers to these questions. Regarding 
the first question, a potentially important omit- 
ted variable is entrepreneurial skill or willing- 
ness to take risks,  a  characteristic which 
enables some individuals to thrive in the new 
environment regardless of other attributes. 
Unobservable  "skills"  could also simply re- 
flect the pure luck of being in the right place 
at the right time in an environment of extreme 
disequilibrium.  In  some  senses the  Russian 
economy is like a lottery, with large rents ac- 
cruing to those well positioned to take advan- 
tage  of  opportunities-but  also  with 
substantial losses for those who draw a losing 
number. Large rents may be available because 
enterprises in some industries continue to ex- 
ercise a substantial  degree of  market power, 
and managers may have an incentive to share 
rents with workers because Russia's privatiza- 
tion strategy resulted in insider ownership for 
the majority  of  privatized  enterprises. While 
rents  are likely  to  be  arbitraged  away  over 
time, the process may be slowed by the limited 
mobility of the population and the huge phys- 
ical area of the country (Russia spans I I time 
zones ) . 
Is the  Change in Russia's  Wage Structure 
Important?--The  changes in  Russia's  wage 
structure have had significant implications for 
the distribution of economic well-being across 
groups. Beyond concerns about equity, how- 
ever, the distributional changes of the reform 
period may be linked to the voting behavior of 
workers,  and thus may have political ramifi- 
cations as well. In particular, the "losers"  of 
the transition may be more likely to vote, and 
more likely to support candidates representing 
nationalist or communist parties. VOL. 88 NO. 5  BRAINERD: RUSSIA'S  ECONOMIC  TRANSITION 
TABLE 5-PROBIT RESULTS:  BEHAVIOR  POPULATION, VOTING  OF THE EMPLOYED 
DECEMBER  ELECTION 1993 PARLIAMENTARY 
-
Probability of  voting for far-right parties," 
Probability of voting in the election  conditional on voting  -
Dependent variable:  (I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Predicted loss in  -0.269  0.186  -0.184  -0.061  -0.144  0.164 
wagesb  (-5.86)  (1.04)  (-2.42)  (-1.19)  (-0.69)  (1.94) 
Years of education 
Female (yes = 1) 
Married (yes = 1) 
State (yes = 1) 
Occupation, industry 
and region 
dummies  no  Yes  Yes  Yes  no  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample size  5,203  5,203  5,203  5,203  3,051  3,051  3,051  3,051 
Notes: The sample is for the employed population aged  18 and over. The table reports the change in probability for a 
small change in each independent variable. z-statistics are given in parentheses. 
" Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Agrarian Party, or Communist Party. 
Calculated as -Vg4- jgI), where j,,  and )?,I  are the predicted wages from a regression of log wages on categorical 
education variables and a dummy variable for gender. Wages for 1994 were deflated into 1991 rubles using the wage 
deflation procedure described in Appendix B. 
The 1994 surveys included questions about  wages between  1991 and 1994."  If  increased 
voting behavior in the December 1993 parlia-  wage inequality has affected voting behavior, 
mentary elections. Reformers (the ''Yabloko' '  one would expect the coefficient on this vari- 
and "Russia's  Choice"  parties) unexpectedly  able to have  a positive and  significant sign: 
lost this election to far-right parties (the Agrar-  individuals experiencing a greater ''loss"  over 
ian  and Communist  Parties,  and  the Liberal  the period would be more likely to vote, and 
Democrats-a  misnomer for a pro-communist  more  likely  to vote  for the  far-right parties 
party). The voting information was used to es-  which  promise  to  slow  or reverse  the  eco-
timate two probit regressions, one testing the  nomic  reforms.  These  regressions  were 
characteristics  associated  with  voting  in the 
election, and the other testing the characteris- 
tics associated  with voting for the Liberal 
" This variable is calculated a:; -(j,,  -j,, ), wherejy4 Democrats, the  Communist Party,  or the  and jYl are the predicted wages from a regression of  log 
Agrarian  Party.  These regressions  include  a  wages on categorical education variables and a dummy 
variable for the individual's predicted loss in  variable for gender in the respective years. 1112  THE AMERICAN  ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1998 
estimated  both  including  and  excluding  this 
variable; the sample is the employed popula- 
tion aged 18 and over, and thus includes work- 
ing pensioners. 
Results of  these regressions are summarized 
in Table 5. Individuals who are older, more ed- 
ucated, and married were more Uely to vote, 
and men were more likely to vote than women 
[column (211. While column (1) indicates that 
those who have "lost'' more over the period are 
actually less llkely to vote, this effect becomes 
statistically insignificant once one controls for 
demographic characteristics [column (3)]. This 
is likely due to the strong correlation between 
the "loss' ' variable and years of education (cor- 
relation = -0.67).  Omitting the latter variable 
as  in column (4),  the results suggest that the 
"losers"  are indeed less likely to vote. However, 
it is clearly impossible to distinguish this effect 
from the effect of education on voting behavior. 
As might be expected, less-educated work- 
ers and older individuals were more likely to 
support the  far-right  parties,  and  men  were 
more likely than women to vote for these par- 
ties [column (6)].  The predicted loss in wages 
appears to have little impact on an individual's 
support for  nationalist or communist parties 
[columns (5) and (7)],  although the variable 
has a positive and statistically significant sign 
when the education variable is omitted [col- 
umn (8)]. Again, however, one cannot draw 
firm conclusions based on this specification. 
Thus, individuals who have fared poorly in 
the labor market appear (if anything) less 
likely to participate in elections; and the evi- 
dence that the  "losers9' express their dissat- 
isfaction  at the polls  by  voting  for  far-right 
parties is inconclusive. 
V.  Conclusion 
While rising inequality is clearly evident on 
the streets of  Moscow and is widely noted in 
the press, few would have guessed at the re- 
markable and rapid increase in wage inequal- 
ity that has occurred in Russia in the last few 
years. The  '"inners"  from this transforma-. 
tion--at  least in the short period under study 
here---are  young  well-educated  men  whose 
skills have enabled them to exploit new profit- 
making opportunities in the private sector of 
the  economy. The losers  are older  workers, 
men  in particular,  whose human  capital has 
been devalued and who have few incentives to 
acquire  new  skills relevant  to  the  emerging 
economy. Women also appear to be among the 
biggest losers from the transition. Since profit- 
making opportunities and large rents will be 
arbitraged away over time and individuals will 
acquire  new  skills,  an eventual  decrease  in 
wage inequality in Russia should be expected. 
But -barring government  interventions -
this will happen much more slowly than did 
the rise in inequality. 
'TABLE Al--REPRESENTATIVENESS  DATA OF SURVEY 
1991  1993  1994  1993 Labor 
Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted  Force Surveya 
Sample size  2,964  1  1,829  8,868  580,000 
Sex, percent 
Male 
Female 
Ages 16-72,  percent 
16-19  7.6  7.3  5.3  5.0  6.1  7.4  8.0 
20-24  10.1.  9.2  10.1  9.9  9.6  9.1  7.6 
25-29  10.9  11.1  9.7  9.6  9.8  9.5  7.5 
30-49  38.8  35.9  45.6  47.0  46.0  42.9  39.8 VOL. 88 NO. 5  BRAINERD:  RUSSIA'S  ECONOMIC  TRANSITION  I113 
TABLE Al-Continued. 
-
1991  1993  1994. - 1993 Labor 
Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted  Force Surveya  -
Ages 16-72,  percent 
50-54  9.1  8.9  6.7  6.7  6.3  6.1  7.8 
55-59  8.0  9.6  8.1  7.6  7.9  8.2  9.3 
60-72  15.4  18.3  14.6  14.2  14.4  16.8  20.0 
Education, employed 
population, percent 
Ages 16-72 
Primary or less  2.1  4.2  2.5  2.6  1.6  2.9  3.1 
Incomplete secondary  10.3  18.4  5.7  5.9  5.7  11.3  14.6 
General secondary  21.5  19.4  17.2  18.0  17.7  20.1  31.5 
Vocational  17.1  18.7  15.5  17.1  15.3  19.8 
Specialized secondary  23.6  22.6  30.2  31.5  31.5  31.1  32.0 
Incomplete higher  2.5  1.7  2.3  2.0  2.8  1.8  1.6 
Higher  22.9  14.9  26.5  22.9  25.5  13.1  17.2 
Region, all population,  Actualb 
percent  (Jan. 1994) 
North  5.1  4.4  3.4  3.5  4.7  4.8  4.1 
Northwest  5.9  4.4  9.4  9.6  5.8  5.6  5.5 
Central'  21.5  18.2  13.1  13.0  14.1  15.8  14.4 
Volga-Vyatsky  4.5  5.1  5.1  5.8  5.8  5.6  5.7 
Central Chemozem  0.0  0.0  4.8  5.2  5.3  5.6  5.3 
Povolzhsky  13.4  13.8  9.9  9.1  11.3  11.9  11.3 
North Caucuses  9.2  9.6  10.2  10.5  11.3  10.3  11.8 
Urals  13.7  16.6  11.0  11.5  14.6  13.6  13.8 
Western Siberia  11.0  10.2  8.9  10.3  10.1  10.1  10.2 
Eastern Siberia  5.9  7.0  6.1  6.6  5.8  5.9  6.2 
Far East  3.4  4.7  4.6  4.8  5.0  5.4  5.2 
Moscow city  6.3  6.1  13.6  10.2  6.3  5.6  5.9 
-
"Population aged  15-72.  Source: Goskomstat, Statisticheskoye  Obozreniye No.  I  [Statistical Survey], September 
1994d pp. 62-64. 
Chislennost' Naseleniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Population of the Russian Federation] (Goskomstat, 1994a pp. 3-5). 
" Excluding Moscow. 
was  calculated  as  a  Paasche  index;  thus 
changes in the index reflect both  changes in 
The real 1994 wages used to create Figure 2  prices and changes in the weights of goods in 
were deflated using a series of chained regional  the basket. When the structure of consumption 
price indices. Regional rather than national-level  is  changing-as  would  be  expected  during 
price indices were used because inflation rates  price liberalization-the  weights will vary 
vary significantly across regions.  monthly and the monthly  retail price indices 
The following price indices were chained in  should not be chained. If they are chained, as 
order to deflate wages:  they are here, actual price movements will be 
May 1991  -May  1992: an annual retail price  distorted. The direction of the bias is indeter- 
index for this period.  minate because it depends on income and sub- 
June-December  1992: monthly retail price  stitution effects. The consumer price index is 
indices.  based on a basket of 262 goods and is calcu- 
January  1993  -May  1994: monthly con-  lated  as a Laspereyes  index,  reflecting only 
sumer price indices.  price  changes  with  fixed weights.  (Note: A 
The retail price index tracked the prices of  few regions  were missing price index infor- 
1,000 consumer goods and 300 services and  mation  in  one or months;  in  these cases an Ill4  THE AMERICAN E(  -0NOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER I998 
average of the price indices in the surrounding 
regions was used as an approximation.) 
While chaining all of these indices clearly 
creates an inconsistent deflator, these are the 
only regional price indices currently available 
for this time period. Given the numerous prob- 
lems with these price indices, the changes in 
real wages discussed here should be taken as 
indicative of relative changes rather than fact. 
The methodology of and problems with Rus- 
sian price  indices  are  discussed in  detail in 
Vincent Koen and Steven Phillips ( 1993) and 
Brigitte Granville and Judith Shapiro ( 1994). 
The sources of the regional price indices are 
Goskomstat (State Statistical Committee, the 
government agency responsible for collecting 
and disseminating statistics in Russia), 1992, 
1993. 1994c. 
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